BlackBerry Homestretch - PT I

The last paragraph of the June 8th blog entry read:

Therefore, the Gemara is thus rejecting our previous explanation of R. Eliezer. Because even his father, on whom his view was presumably based, would rule stringently on a psik reisha, and therefore, the case of removing the berries on YT. The question therefore still stands: On what basis does R. Eliezer allow the berry removal on Yom Tov?

To answer this question on R. Eliezer, the Gemara answers:

הכא במאי עסקינן

דאית ליה הושענא אחריתי

In other words, the person who is gathering the berries to eat has another lulav packet, and is not in need of this hadas to perform the mitzvah. 

Somehow, the introduction of this אוקימתא- takes the case out of one of Psik Reisha and makes berry removal - for the sake of eating - permissible.

Why?

Reflecting on this sugyah, there seem to be two ways in which something could become a non-psik reisha:

a) saying that the result is not inevitable - ie reducing the case to one of דבר שאין מתכוין - which we explained meant a melacha that does result, but is not an inevitable result, of a particular action

b) some other categorization of the action that completely removes it from the realm of psik reisha, and therefore makes it permissible.

Let's apply these two possibilities to our Gemara's answer:

a) saying that the result is not inevitable - ie reducing the case to one of דבר שאין מתכוין - This is not what our Gemara means when it says that you have another kosher lulav.  In the case of two chairs, one heavy and one light - the heavy chair will most certainly create the groove in the ground (psik reisha) while the light chair will not (davar sh'en mitkaven).  But this is not true of removing the berries of the hadas Why? Halachically, removing the berries seems to inevitably create a kosher hadas!  So there must be another reason: 

b)  some other categorization of the action that completely removes it from the realm of psik reisha. 

Rashi explains: The case of berry-removal when you have another kosher lulav is dissimilar to an actual psik reisha/head removal - because in the latter case, the animal - however you slice it (pardon the pun) is going to die! There is an objective reality of the animal's death that cannot be avoided.  The halacha recognizes this inevitable result and imputes the intent (to do the melacha, נטילת נשמה, to you , even if you didn't consciously want it to happen) 

However, says Rashi, when you have another lulav, you have not done tikkun kli.

But this begs the question!  How has Rashi solved the problem?

I suggested: It is a chiddush that the Torah considers a myrtle branch a kli; it is only a kli in the sense that can be used seven days a year to fulfill a mitzvah.  In other words, berry removal does not create a bowl, plate, cup or fork - a classic kli/vessel.  It only creates a myrtle without berries.  Viewing it as a kli is a chiddush.  The imputing of intent to a person when they didn't plan the result is also a chiddush.  Given the fact that you do not need the myrtle as a mitzvah object, it reverts to its objective status as a non-mitzvah object; In this case, R. Eliezer holds that we are not so stringent as to combine those two chiddushim.... On the other hand, the death of the animal is objective, and not a chiddush that the Torah gives the death a status as נטילת נשמה.  In this kind of a case, we do impute a person's intent.