8.6.10

Probing the Reasoning Behind R. Eliezer

Tanna Kamma in the baraita is the same view as that reflected in our mishna: no permission to remove the berries on Yom Tov.  R. Eliezer (Ben) R. Shimon however, says it's permissible.

But, asks the Gemara, is it not a case of מתקן מנא? ie the Tikkun Kli that Rashi referred to back on 33a?  How, then, could R. Eliezer permit the berry removal on YT?

The Gemara answers that he holds like  his father, R. Shimon, who rules
דבר שאין מתכוין is permissible.

This principle means that when one does a particular action on Shabbat which will lead to a melacha, as long as you had a main intent in mind - and did not necessarily want the melacha to occur - you are exempt from liability.  Not only that, but it's permissible to go ahead and do the action that will lead to the melacha.  That's why the term מותר is used - ie מותר לכתחילה!

The Gemara rejects this explanation, because R. Shimon only ever said his principle in a case where the melacha would not inevitably result from the action.  But in a case where the resultant melacha is inevitable, this is called פסיק רישיה ולא ימות - you cut off its head and it won't die? The concept is that intent to perform the melacha is attributed to you if your action will definitely result in the melacha - along the lines of the death of an animal when you cut off its head.  The case of removing the berries of the hadas is just such a psik reisha.  Why? The berry removal will definitively result in a kosher hadas!  It is an inevitable a result as the death of the animal. 

Therefore, the Gemara is thus rejecting our previous explanation of R. Eliezer.  Because even his father, on whom his view was presumably based, would rule stringently on a psik reisha, and therefore, the case of removing the berries on YT.   The question therefore still stands: On what basis does R. Eliezer allow the berry removal on Yom Tov?

No comments:

Post a Comment

Followers

About This Site